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Epilogue
Lessons from the Origins of
Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation was the first of the social insurance programs to
be widely enacted in the United States. A number of states in the 1920s
and 1930s tentatively expanded workers' compensation to cover a limited
range of occupational diseases. The states considered introducing unem-
ployment insurance, health insurance, and old-age insurance during the
1910s and 1920s, but it was not until the 1930s that the federal government
established unemployment insurance and old-age pensions for nonveter-
ans. Government health insurance for the elderly followed in the 1 960s,
while broader government programs for health insurance have been the
source of controversy in the 1990s.
Because workers' compensation was adopted during the Progressive
Era, there has been a tendency to consider it as just one of the many
reforms that the progressives initiated. In the political arena the progres-
sives proposed and enacted the ballot initiative, referenda, popular elec-
tion of senators, and recall elections for judges across the United States.
In the economic realm, reformers sought a variety of labor market regula-
tions and social insurance programs to protect workers against the risks
associated with an industrializing society. One might argue that market
competition for workers would have provided them with an implicit pay-
ment in the form of a compensating wage premium for accepting the risks
of unemployment, illness, or accident. Moreover, by understanding that
such events could occur, workers could plan their financial affairs in antic-
ipation of experiencing a drop in income.
Social reformers of the early twentieth century understood the logic of
the market, however, they rejected such thinking. As prominent economist
and social reformer Richard T. Ely (1908, 13-14) argued: "The eighteenth
century economic philosophy was... based on a nowdiscredited and dis-
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carded belief in the beneficent code of nature, ruling the economic life as
all other social life spheres, and which, if not interfered with, would bring
to all classes and especially the workers, the maximum amount of eco-
nomic well-being.... Butexperience has shown conclusively that.
unregulated contract does not always conduce to freedom and fair op-
portunity"the square deal"but frequently means bondage and degra-
dation." Further, according to some reformers, not only did market com-
petition fail to protect workers, but individual workers failed to protect
themselves. Reformer Henry Seager (1908, 91) of the American Associa-
tion for Labor Legislation reasoned that since "the development of saving
habits among wage-earners is painfully slow...[i]t is my contention that
these evils [unemployment, accidents, illness] that are not in practice pro-
vided against by individual thrift and forethought can be and should be
provided against by collective action." Thus, if the market supposedly
could not help workers or if they could not help themselves, then govern-
ment could.
Of the ambitious plans of reformers during the Progressive Era for a
social safety net to protect workers from the potentially deleterious effects
of modern industrialism, only workers' compensation was enacted almost
universally across the United States. Such limited success, despite their am-
bitious plans, raises questions about the true strength progressives wielded
in the early twentieth century. If workers' compensation was adopted be-
cause reformers overwhelmed conservative opposition to the expansion of
government, why were the reformers so much less successful in establish-
ing unemployment insurance, health insurance, and many of their other
favored programs? Progressives, although they may have raised the pub-
lic's awareness of the private and social problems that industrial accidents
wrought, have probably received more credit for the success of workers'
compensation than they deserve.
We offer an alternative interpretation of the success of workers' com-
pensation that builds on and enhances the analyses of earlier scholars.
Each of the major interest groupsworkers, employers, and insurance
companiesanticipated gains from the legislation. Employers were dis-
satisfied with an increasingly uncertain negligence liability system that en-
gendered substantial frictions and court costs. Further, they were able to
pass on to workers a substantial portion of the costs of workers' compen-
sation insurance through wage reductions. Workers received on average
much larger payments for workplace accidents than under the old system.
Even if workers "bought" most of this increase in average benefits, their
welfare improved. They had faced problems in obtaining their desired
level of accident insurance before workers' compensation, and the higher
average benefits left them better insured. Finally, insurance companies an-
ticipated gains from workers' compensation, as long as they could avoid
the introduction of state insurance. Insurers had faced information prob-Epilogue: Lessons from the Origins of Workers' Compensation 199
lems in writing individual accident insurance. The shift to workers' com-
pensation allowed commercial insurers to sell more coverage for work-
place accidents than before as employers ended up purchasing more
workers' compensation insurance than the combined amount of accident
and employer liability insurance than they had sold before. Thus, instead
of revolutionary change, workers' compensation was in fact an evolution-
ary change. The legislation evolved from the mutual desires of workers,
employers, and insurers to resolve problems with workplace accident lia-
bility that had developed in the first decade of the twentieth century.
In contrast, employers in the various states showed little interest in sup-
porting state government programs for unemployment insurance, old-age
insurance, or sickness and health insurance. They had not been liable to
workers in these areas before, and few employers saw much reason to ex-
pand their liability during the 191 Os and 1 920s. In addition, doctors ac-
tively opposed government-based health insurance once they had fully
considered the implications of the program for their control of patient
care. In sum, workers' compensation was the only workplace-based social
insurance system that received strong support from all of the major inter-
est groups involved in the issue.
To the extent that progressive reformers were trying to make govern-
ment more responsive to the everyday needs of ordinary Americans, per-
haps workers' compensation can be considered "progressive." Compensa-
tion legislation sprang from the shared interest of employers and workers
to correct a market and legal imperfection. Both parties would have liked
to have written a contract whereby workers, before any accident occurred,
waived their rights to negligence suits in return for a fixed and guaranteed
set of benefits. Yet, the common law and legislation in a number of states
prevented employers and workers from individually negotiating preacci-
dent contracts. Workers, reformers, and judges seem to have decided that
individual workers could too easily have been persuaded to sign away their
rights to negligence suits for an inadequate set of benefits, and thus the lot
of the typical worker would be improved by having the benefits negotiated
through the political process. The workers' compensation laws therefore
both allowed these preaccident contracts and completed the contract by
establishing the set of benefits to be paid.
Our interpretation of the origins of workers' compensation turns the
analysis of the Progressive Era in a new direction. Progressive legislation
has been seen by some as either top-down or bottom-up, that is, imposed
by employers or won by workers and reformers. Yet reformers typically
succeeded only when a variety of interest groups anticipated gains from
their proposals. Therefore, future research into this episode of American
economic and political history must address why such common ground
could not be struck on other plans such as unemployment insurance, old-
age pensions, and health insurance. Because progressives failed to rally200Chapter 8
support for their other plans, it was workers' compensation that served as
a prelude to the welfare state, setting the stage for the dramatic expansion
of the government's role during the New Deal and Great Society.
Placing our research into the broader context of the literature on institu-
tional change, our results are consistent with an optimistic view of insti-
tutional development. While some recent research shows that expected
net gains are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for institutional
change to occur, workers' compensation seems to be a case where legisla-
tion popular with large segments of the each of the major interest groups
was passed.1 Early research on the economics of institutional development
offered only limited discussion of the actual process of change. Our study
has uncovered in detail the important hurdles that must be overcome be-
fore a new legal regime is implemented. The realization that the major
players could gain from the legislation is only a starting point. The interest
groups still have to complete the tedious and often frustrating task of
building the political coalition that ensures legislative success.
In the case of workers' compensation, although the majority in each
group with a stake in the legislation supported the general idea of a no-
fault accident compensation scheme, establishing a consensus on the spe-
cific details of the law within each group and across the interest groups
often proved quite contentious. The legislation was very complex, con-
sisting of multiple attributes that required multidimensional negotiations
and trade-offs. In some cases when a consensus could not be reached,
the passage of the income-improving policy was delayed. Thus, although
groups may see benefits from a new institutional arrangement, how they
resolve the distributional conflicts that naturally arise when the rules of the
game are changed is what will determine whether profitable institutions
displace the unprofitable. Specifically, because workers' compensation was
so widely supported and offered critical relief from the worsening negli-
gence liability system, workers' or employers' groups were willing to settle
for less desirable features of the legislation but with the full expectation of
amending the system later. In many states, for example, unions accepted
relatively low benefit levels in the beginning, despite some internal squab-
bles, in order to establish the basic law. In many of these states they later
succeeded in ratcheting these benefits upward.
Finally, a natural question to ask of any historical study concerns what
we can learn from the past. One lesson we might learn is that state-level
liability legislation is more likely to become widespread when the major
interest groups all favor it. During the 1 970s there was a series of attempts
to limit negligence liability and introduce no-fault liability for automobile
accident insurance, which seems like a move similar to the adoption of
workers' compensation. Yet, only sixteen states adopted no-fault laws and
several have since repealed them.2 There were some similarities in the
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auto insurance premiums were more likely to adopt the no-fault auto in-
surance laws, just as states that faced the greatest problems with employ-
ers' liability adopted workers' compensation earlier in the 1910s. The con-
trast between the no-fault laws may lie in two areas. First, the expectations
for gain might not have been as great for automobile liability. There is
only weak evidence that limiting tort liability reduces accident rates and
severity. Consumers sought lower insurance premiums, but the evidence
that no-fault laws lowered insurance premiums is mixed (Harrington 1994,
277). Second, there is a difference in the extent to which key interest
groups were in agreement on the benefits of the liability change. Workers'
compensation was favored by most workers, employers, and insurers, all
represented by significant lobbying groups. Many attorneys also sup-
ported the legislation. On the other hand, no-fault automobile insurance
laws, while favored by high-income drivers and the medical community,
were vehemently opposed by tort lawyers. The success of the no-fault auto
insurance laws in each state therefore was determined more by the strength
of opposing lobbies. The limited passage of no-fault auto insurance laws
reminds us more of the battles over state insurance waged by insurers and
organized labor. In that case the stiff opposition of insurance companies
prevented a majority of states from establishing state funds.
We might also ask how the insights gleaned from the history of the
adoption of workers' compensation might guide efforts to reform the sys-
tem today. A central reason why workers' compensation received wide-
spread support in the 1910s was that it helped resolve legal and informa-
tion problems associated with insuring individual workers' accident risk.
The escalation of workers' compensation costs over the past twenty years
has led to increasing dissatisfaction with the program. Ironically, a major
reason why costs rose so rapidly stems from increasing problems with in-
suring workers' compensation risk associated with moral hazard.
The increase in moral hazard problems may stem from the expansion
in benefit levels and injury coverage from the beginning of workers' com-
pensation to the modern setting. The workers' compensation laws in the
early 1 900s explicitly limited problems with moral hazard. Workers bore
a significant share of the burden of the injury because they received at
most two-thirds (and often less) of their income in replacement. Medical
costs were covered, but only up to a maximum level typically ranging from
one hundred to two hundred dollars. Finally, the types of accidents arising
at the time were relatively easy to monitor. Workers at the time were sus-
taining severe sprains, breaking bones, or losing limbs.
Since that time the level of benefits has been determined in the political
arena. Into the 1 970s, wage replacement rates were relatively low, in part
because legislatures in a number of states were slow to raise weekly maxi-
mums. But in the 1 970s legislatures finally responded to the demands of
workers by raising the weekly maximums paid for benefits. Changes in the202Chapter 8
extent of taxation also played a substantial role in making benefits more
lucrative because workers' compensation benefits are not subject to in-
come taxes. Prior to World War II, less than 7 percent of American house-
holds paid income tax and prior to 1935 there was no social security tax.
Thus, very few workers were subject to income taxes and there was almost
no gap between after-tax income and pretax income. As tax rates have
increased and the income levels at which taxes are paid have been lowered,
the gap between after-tax income and regular income has grown. In con-
sequence, workers' compensation benefits today replace from 80 to 100
percent of after-tax income, even though they may only replace 45 to 67
percent of pretax income. In addition, the costs of medical care for com-
pensation injuries have risen sharply and in many states there is no deduct-
ible nor is there a limit on insurance payments. Finally, the most common
types of injuries now are ones where detection is more problematic, partic-
ularly back injuries, and in some states coverage has been expanded to
include job-related stress.
All three of these trends have contributed to increased problems with
moral hazard.3 In response, employers and insurers have proposed reforms
designed to reduce problems with moral hazard by limiting benefits, intro-
ducing medical copayments and narrowing the range of compensable in-
juries. For the reforms to succeed, employers and insurers likely will have
to persuade workers to join in a coalition favoring reform. In return for
their support, workers must anticipate some benefit. They might be willing
to participate in such a reform coalition if they expected their wages to
rise in response to diminished postaccident benefits, as most empirical stud-
ies of compensating differences predict. However, would risk-averse work-
ers be able to use the wage premiums to purchase private insurance to
replace the reduction in their benefits? Certainly the disability and health
insurance markets have broadened and deepened since the early 1900s.
On the other hand, workers would be trying to replace the segment of the
benefits that may have been the primary source of the modern increase in
moral hazard problems. In fact, Moore and Viscusi (1990, 62) found that
workers valued the increase in benefits in the 1970s so highly that they
were willing to accept wage reductions that were nearly triple the increase
in expected benefits.
Studying the origins of workers' compensation convinces us that the
success of uniting workers, employers, and insurers to reform the modern
workers' compensation system turns on workers' ability to privately insure
some aspects of their own workplace accident risk. Because the moral
hazard and adverse selection problems of insuring an individual's accident
risk are great, especially for hard-to-detect injuries, it is not clear that
workers will be able to find private insurance for the greater coverage that
they received from the reforms of the 1970s. By raising benefit levels and
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seemed humane, the states have created a situation in which insurance
problems have contributed to escalating workers' compensation costs.
To resolve the insurance issues may require reducing the benefits and
coverage from levels highly valued by workers. Employers would experi-
ence a reduction in their workers' compensation premiums that reflects
both the lower benefits and reduced moral hazard problems. Yet, for work-
ers to be made whole in this setting, if Moore and Viscusi's estimates of
workers' valuations for the 1970s are correct, wages would have to rise by
triple the decline in expected benefits. It is not clear that employers would
be willing to pay such an increase in wage rates and, given the general
distrust of markets as protectors of workers' interests, it might be harder
still to convince workers that they would receive such a large increase.
Thus, a modern reform would likely mean making one group better off at
the expense of the other. The introduction of workers' compensation was
relatively easy because so many interest groups gained. In contrast, re-
forming the modern problems with workers' compensation might be far
more vexing because there may not be a simple reform that allows both
workers and employers to gain relative to their positions under the cur-
rent system.
Notes
See, for instance, Libecap (1 989a) and Kantor (1998) for historical case stud-
ies showing the complex process of institutional change.
Our description of the adoption of automobile no-fault insurance laws is
drawn from Harrington (1994).
Studies of the impact of higher benefit levels suggest that the number of re-
ported temporary total disability accidents rises when benefit levels increase, while
fatal and severe accident rates do not rise and in some cases fall. Kniesner and
Leeth (1991) and Viscusi (1992) claim that this may be a sign that the problems
with moral hazard may be less a function of workers' reducing the care that they
exercise in the workplace and more a problem with increased reporting of acci-
dents and possible fraud. Results also suggest that extending the waiting period
reduces the number of reported accidents.